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CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON: THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
STATEMENTS TO PHYSICIANS AND THE USE OF CLOSED-
CIRCUIT TELEVISION IN CASES OF CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE
JON SIMON STEFANUCA*
In Crawford v. Washington,' the United States Supreme Court
held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment bars all
out-of-court testimonial evidence2 unless the declarant is unavailable
and the person against whom the evidence is introduced had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 3  By excluding all
testimonial evidence unless the above conditions are met, regardless of
whether such evidence could be admitted under a well-established
hearsay exception or court procedure, 4 the Court created a significant
risk that minor victims of sexual abuse will neither be able to testify
via Closed-Circuit Television (CCT) nor be able to introduce
statements made to treating physicians in the aftermath of the sexual
abuse. Where the goal of the Confrontation Clause is to insure a
reliable fact-finding process in criminal trials, 5 an extension of the
Crawford holding to bar the use of CCT and statements to physicians
would deny minors the ability to effectively and truthfully testify
against their abusers and thus undermine the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause-to insure the reliability of evidence.
I. THE CASE
Michael Crawford ("Petitioner") was arrested and convicted of
first-degree assault with a deadly weapon for stabbing another who
attempted to rape his wife. 6  When the Petitioner learned about the
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, 2007. B.S., Economics and
Political Science, magna cum laude, Towson University. For additional publications by Mr.
Stefanuca, see: The PRI and Its Demise as Mexico's Single Ruling Party, 38 Towson U.J. Int'l
Aff. 32 (2002); The ICC and the United States: Arguments in Favor of Ratification of the
Rome Treaty, 37 Towson U. J. Int'l Aff. (2001).
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. Id. at 51. Testimonial evidence is an affirmation or declaration "for the purpose of
proving some fact." Id. When the testimonial statement is made, the declarant reasonably
expects that the statements will be used at trial. Id. Examples of testimonial evidence include
ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing and statements to police officers during an
interrogation. Id. at 53.
3. Id. at 68-69.
4. Id. at 51-52.
5. Id. at 61.
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
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attempted rape, he and his wife went looking for the alleged
perpetrator.7 They drove to the apartment of Kenneth Lee, the alleged
perpetrator, where a fight between the Petitioner and the Mr. Lee
ensued.8 As a result of the fight, the Petitioner suffered a cut to the
hand and the victim was stabbed in the torso.
9
Later the same day, the Petitioner and his wife were arrested.' 0
The police read both their Miranda rights and subsequently
interrogated both. 1  In the trial court, Petitioner testified that the
victim reached into his pocket before the Petitioner proceeded to stab
the victim. 12 He testified that he was never sure as to whether the
victim reached for a knife, but argued that he cut his hand on an object
that the victim produced. 13
Petitioner's wife, Sylvia, testified as well.14 The police tape-
recorded her testimony.1 5 During her testimony, the Petitioner was not
given the opportunity to cross-examine his wife. 1 6 Furthermore, her
testimony, while significantly similar to her husband's, differed
slightly.' Her testimony suggested that the victim did not attempt to
pull an object out of his pocket.1 8 She also testified that the victim was
stabbed and fell to the ground with empty hands.19
At the trial, Petitioner argued self-defense. His wife did not
testify because she was barred from testifying by the marital
privilege. 2 1 She could not waive the privilege because, in Washington
state, the husband and wife both hold the privilege.22  As such,
Petitioner would have to consent in order for his wife to testify.
However, under Washington law, the marital privilege does not apply










16. Id. at 39-41.
17. Id. at 39.
18. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 39.
19. Id.






exception. 4  Accordingly, the state moved to introduce the wife's
tape-recorded testimony as a statement against interest.
25
During the trial, the Petitioner argued that admitting the
recorded testimony into evidence would violate his constitutional right
to confront the witnesses against him.26 Specifically, he argued that he
lacked an opportunity to cross-examine his wife at the time the
statement was made.2 The trial judge, relying on the United States
28Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Roberts, admitted the testimony
into evidence. 29 The court reasoned that, under Roberts, regardless of
whether the declarant is available, hearsay evidence may be admitted
if it falls under an established hearsay exception or manifests
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 30 Because the wife had
first-hand knowledge about the events, did not try to shift blame, and
her story was sufficiently similar to that of the Petitioner, the court
found her testimony trustworthy. 31 Subsequently, the jury rendered a
conviction, and the Petitioner appealed.32
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the District Court
decision, finding that the wife's testimony was not reliable. 33  The
court reasoned that, "the statement contradicted one that she had
previously given; it was made in response to specific questions; and, at
one point, she admitted shutting her eyes during the stabbing." 34 The
court also noted that, while the wife's testimony is similar to that of
the Petitioner, it differs on a crucial detail-whether the victim tried to
reach for an object before the stabbing.35
The Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the
conviction. The court reasoned that there was sufficient overlap
between Petitioner's testimony and that of his wife.37 Specifically,
because of the great similarity between the two statements, the court
deemed the wife's statement reliable. 38  Subsequently, the United
24. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. "Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).
25. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. The State argued that she was a co-conspirator. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
29. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 41.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 41-42.
38. Id.
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States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the
admission of the wife's tape-recorded statement violated the
Confrontation Clause of United States Constitution. 39
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Generally
The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that, "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him.,,4u This
constitutional requirement is made applicable to the states via the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
41
The historical background of the clause reveals its purpose.
The intent of the founders in adopting the Confrontation Clause was to
prohibit the use of ex parte testimony in criminal trials.42  The
founders' intended to eliminate the use of ex parte affidavits as
substitutes for cross-examination, which provides the accused with an
opportunity to directly 9uestion the testimony and the credibility of the
witnesses against him.% Similarly, given this historical context, the
Constitution permits the use of out-of-court testimonial evidence if the
defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.44
Consistent with the founders' intent, the United States Supreme
Court interprets the Confrontation Clause to grant the accused two
distinct rights: the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him
and the right to confront the witnesses face-to-face. 45  Also, while
these are two distinct rights, the Court pronounced that they are of
somewhat equal importance. 46  Recently, however, the Court
39. Id. at 36.
40. U.S. Const. amend VI.
41. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990).
42. See Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
157 (1970).
43. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242.
44. Green, 399 U.S. at 166-67.
45. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.1012, 1015-16 (1988); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65
(1980). Note that the Court in Crawford effectively overruled the Roberts case. However, the
Roberts case represents the prevailing view on the issue of hearsay admissibility employed in
numerous cases for twenty-four years and could be resurrected if the Crawford decision fails
to withstand the scrutiny of time. See, e.g., Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir.
1990); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1985); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
Furthermore, the Roberts holding could still apply in cases of non-testimonial hearsay.
46. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-21.
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questioned this assumption by holding that the right of the accused to
confront a witness face-to-face is not absolute.47
The purpose of the accused's right to face the witness against
him is to insure and validate the accuracy of the trial fact-finding
process.48 That is, a face-to-face confrontation is required because the
witness is more likely to take the testimony seriously in the presence
of the judge, jury and the defendant. 49 As such, the Confrontation
Clause makes it more difficult for a witness to get away with lying
where the jury observes the demeanor and evaluates the credibility of
the testifying witness. 50 The witness herself is more likely to provide
accurate testimony, as the confrontation will remind her of the possible
impact her testimony may have on the accused's life.51
However, it is not always clear what a face-to-face
confrontation entails. It is undisputed that it requires the jury and the
judge to observe the demeanor of a witness during the testimony.5 2
The Court in the Coy case held that the right of face-to-face
confrontation presumes the ability of the accused to observe the
witness against him and to cross-examine and impeach such a
witness. 53 In the Mattox case, the Court adds that the right of face-to-
face confrontation exists to compel a witness against the accused to
face the jury so that it may ascertain his credibility. 54 Compelling the
witness to testify in front of the jury means that the judge has an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness as well. 55 These
subtleties are important because the court has never explicitly held that
a witness against the accused, while being observed by the accused
and facing the jury and the judge, has to physically observe the
accused as well.
The more certain protection in the Confrontation Clause is the
accused's right to cross-examine the witness against him both as to the
substance of the testimony and the credibility of the witness.
56
Sometimes, the Court explicitly refers to this right as the primary
protection of the Confrontation Clause. 57 The Court in Green stated
that cross-examination is the "greatest legal engine ever invented for
47. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990).
48. See id. at 846; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64-65.
49. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64-65; Craig, 497 U.S. at 847-48.
50. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
51. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
52. Id. at 1020.
53. Id.
54. Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
55. See id.
56. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846
(1990).
57. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,418 (1965)).
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the discovery of truth" precisely because it exposes the witness against
the accused to the collective scrutiny of the jury, judge, and the
defendant. 58 But the Court also placed limits on the accused's right to
cross-examine his accuser by holding that the Constitution requires
effective cross-examination and not cross-examination that may be
convenient for the accused.
59
A corollary of the accused's right to face and cross-examine a
witness against him is the right not to be confronted with hearsay
evidence. Generally, courts refuse to admit hearsay evidence
because it consists of out-of-court statements where the declarant is
not under oath, in the presence of the jury, or subject to cross-
examination. 61 As such, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a
violation of the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is willing to
testify at trial.62
But, it is important to note that, despite the significant overlay
between hearsay and confrontation, they are separate legal notions.2
The Court in Green stated:
Our decisions have never established such
congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a
violation of confrontation values even though the
statements in issue were admitted under an arguably
recognized hearsay exception. The converse is equally
true: merely because evidence is admitted in violation
of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the
automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have
been denied. 64
B. Exceptions
1. Hearsay and the Requirement of Cross-Examination
While the Constitution discourages the use of hearsay in
criminal trials, it does not intend a complete bar on hearsay evidence.
65
58. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (citing 5 HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
59. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 849-50. For example, where the defendant can observe the
witness testifying and can communicate with his counsel, requiring the witness to also face the
defendant is not mandatory for effective cross-examination of the witness. See id.
60. Green, 399 U.S. at 154-55.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 155.
64. Id. at 155-56 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968)); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965).
65. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); see also Green, 399 U.S. at 156-57.
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The United States Supreme Court has held that the Confrontation
Clause must account for the necessities of the trial.66 As such, hearsay
can come in when the proponent of the evidence is able to demonstrate
a necessity requiring the use of hearsay evidence. 67 Such a necessity
may exist when the declarant is unavailable 68 and the declarant's out-
of-court statement is "marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is
no material departure from the reason of the general rule."'
69
A presumption of trustworthiness is generally applied when the
out-of-court statement of an unavailable declarant falls within a well-
established hearsay exception. Otherwise, to avoid the requirement
of cross-examination (when the statement was uttered and even at trial
in some circumstances), the proponent of the evidence must show that
the evidence is supported by particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.7' The reason underlying this rule is to allow the use
of hearsay evidence that does not fit into an established hearsay
exception only when it is as reliable as testimony subject to cross-
examination.
2. Hearsay and the Requirement of Face-to-Face
Confrontation
The Confrontation Clause does not guarantee a criminal
defendant the absolute right to face the witnesses against him.73 The
Court seems willing to create exceptions to the right of confrontation
when making the exception is "necessary to further an important
public policy."74 Furthermore, the face-to-face requirement should not
be absolute because giving the requirement its "literal meaning" would
eliminate all hearsay exceptions.75 Nevertheless, aware of these
considerations, courts avoid making rules that would completely
mitigate the importance of the face-to-face requirement by making
findings of necessity on a witness-specific basis.
Also, sometimes, "substantial compliance" with the
Confrontation Clause may excuse the lack of face-to-face
66. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63; see also Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
67. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64.
68. Id.; Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Green, 339 U.S. at 162.
69. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)).
70. Id. at 66.
71. See id. at 65-66.
72. Id. (citing Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)); Green, 399 U.S. at 155;
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)).
73. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849-50 (1990).
74. Id. at 850.
75. Id. at 848.
76. Id.
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confrontation.77 For example, in Delaware v. Fensterer, the Court
held that the Confrontation Clause is satisfied "when the defense is
given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose.. . infirmities [in
the testimony] through cross-examination, thereby calling to the
attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the
witness' testimony.,
78
The following two uses of evidence-hearsay statements to
physicians and CCT testimony-illustrate that the Confrontation
Clause does not impose an absolute requirement of face-to-face
confrontation and cross-examination on the admissibility of hearsay
evidence.
(a). Statements to Physicians
The use of out-of-court statements made to physicians for the
purpose of treatment is a well-recognized exception to the general bar
against the use of hearsay evidence. 79 This exception is particularly
relevant in cases involving minor victims of child abuse. Courts
reason that as long as the purpose for making the statement is medical,
the statement should be admitted into evidence. 80  This includes
statements by minors, identifying the sexual 8predator where the
identification is necessary for medical treatment. A justification for
the admissibility of such evidence is that children are inherently
unlikely or unable to lie about sexual matters. 82 In some jurisdictions,
the court must make a determination of unavailability (i.e., that the
child is incompetent to testify) before admitting hearsay evidence into
83the record. But even if the witness is available and the statement is
not made for the sole purpose of treatment, the statement may still
come into evidence if it manifests particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.
84
(b). The Confrontation Clause and Testimony via Closed-
Circuit Television
In many cases of child sexual abuse, judges have used their
discretion to allow minor victims to testify via CCT, thus giving the
77. Id. at 851.
78. 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985) (per curiam); see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730,
744 (1987) (holding that exclusion of the defendant from a competency hearing did not violate
the Confrontation Clause); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974); Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,418 (1965).
79. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4).
80. See, e.g., U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985).
81. Id. at 438; see also U.S. v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 1993).
82. State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (Kan. 1985).
83. See id. at 843.
84. U.S. v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 100 (9th Cir. 1992).
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victims an opportunity to testify without physically observing their
85
abusers. Many states have gone beyond the mere discretion of
judges and passed statutes providing for CCT testimony when there is
a showing of necessity. 86 The Court has recognized that a state may
determine that it has a substantial interest in "protecting children who
are... victims of child abuse from the trauma of testifying against the
... perpetrator .... ,"7 Furthermore, the Court clarified that protecting
"minor victims of sex crimes from ... trauma and embarrassment..."
is a compelling interest. 88 Also, while recognizing the importance of a
defendant's right to face his accuser, the Court in Craig pronounced
that the state's interest in protecting minor victims of sex crimes might
outweigh an accused's right to face the accuser.
89
However, in the absence of face-to-face confrontation, a court,
considering the use of CCT, must make a case-specific finding that
''protecting [a] child ... from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse
case" is necessary. 90 To do so, a court must find: (1) that the CCT
testimony is necessary to protect the welfare of the child; (2) that "the
child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally,
but by the presence of the defendant;" and (3) that "the emotional
distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant
is more than de minimis . . ." (nervousness, excitement, or general
excitement to testify in court do not suffice). 91
In addition, courts may approve CCT testimony in the interest
of providing accurate testimony at trial.92 The judge, often with the
aid of an expert, may determine that confronting the child with the
sexual predator may make the child unable to testify.93 In Craig, the
Court determined that the emotional trauma caused by the defendant's
presence is likely to impair the child victim's ability to communicate.
94
In State v. Rupe, the court relied on the testimony of a child
physiologist to determine that confronting the abuser (defendant) will
cause the child severe trauma such that the child witness may not give
truthful testimony.
95
85. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851-52 (1990).
86. See id.; e.g., Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 11-303 (2002).
87. Craig, 497 U.S. at 852.
88. Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County, 457 U.S.
596, 607 (1982)).
89. Id. at 853.
90. Id. at 855.
91. Id. at 855-56.
92. See id. at 853-54.
93. Craig, 497 U.S. at 856.
94. Id. at 857.
95. State v. Rupe, 534 N.W.2d 442, 444 (Iowa 1995).
4192005]
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Furthermore, courts are more likely to allow CCT testimony
when there is a showing that the use of CCT has a minimal impact on
the defendant's right to confront the witness against him." The CCT
testimony must closely resemble the in-court testimony.97 Similarly,
the use of CCT is more likely to be constitutional if, during the
testimony, the accused is able to communicate with his attorney.
98
Similarly, courts are more likely to uphold CCT testimony where the
CCT system provides a proper transmission of the sound and image
from the place of the witness's physical presence.
99
At this juncture, it must be noted that the Court has not yet had
the opportunity to decide whether the CCT testimony constitutes
hearsay. Nevertheless, the majority in Craig noted that even if CCT
testimony were hearsay, it would pass muster because its indicia of
reliability are far greater than that of traditional hearsay.' 
00
3. The Discretion of the Trial Judge
Finally, it is important to comment on the discretion of the trial
judge regarding issues of trial procedure and evidence. Federal Rule
of Evidence 611, among other sources, provides that the court must
protect witnesses from "harassment or undue embarrassment" and
must provide effective procedures for the "ascertainment of truth."
10 1
Also, issues in the discretion of the trial court are reviewed for abuse
of discretion. 1° 2 And the importance of judicial discretion in criminal
cases calls for "exceptionally clear proof" to conclude that a trial court
abused its discretion.10 3 Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Evidence
provide that, in making evidentiary decisions, the court must act to
insure the "promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined."l°4
In State v. Tarrago, the court explicitly held that the judge
retains the discretion to implement trial procedures not expressly
authorized by the United States Supreme Court to further "'important
96. State v. Warford, 389 N.W.2d 575, 580-81 (Neb. 1986).
97. Id. at 581-82.
98. Id.
99. Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 542 N.E.2d 366, 375-76 (1988). For more
information relating to requirements for proper CCT testimony, see generally Closed-Circuit
Television Witness Examination, 61 A.L.R. 4th 1155 (2005).
100. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851 (1990).
101. Fed. R. Evid. 611.
102. See State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278, 1287 (Utah 2001).
103. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 280 (1987).
104. Fed. R. Evid. 102.
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public interests."'1 0 5 This includes a court's power to protect minor
witnesses.10 6 In trials where testimony via CCT is necessary to protect
children, the discretion of the judge is particularly important because
neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide clear guidelines for the use of CCT
testimony. 1
07
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court,
in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, reversed the decision of the
Washington Supreme Court' 0 8 and overruled Ohio v. Roberts."°9 The
Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment bars
out-of-court testimonial evidence unless the declarant is unavailable
and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant.11
0
The Court argued that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the
defendant the right to confront witnesses against him.11' Furthermore,
this constitutional right is operative in all federal criminal prosecutions
and is made applicable to state criminal prosecutions via the
Fourteenth Amendment." 2 Because the Confrontation Clause could
be read to apply only to witnesses at trial, the Court relies on the
clause's historical background to ascertain its meaning."
The court noted that English courts began the development of
the ideas embodied in the Confrontation Clause. 14 While the common
law tradition was to require in-court testimony subject to cross-
examination, many English courts started to absorb the civil law
practice of admitting pretrial examinations not subject to cross-
examination by the defendant. 15  As the use of such pretrial
examinations became widespread, so did their shortcomings, resulting
105. 800 So.2d 300, 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting State v. Ford, 626 So.2d
1338, 1345 (Fla. 1993)).
106. See id. at 302; see also Harrell v. State, 709 So.2d 1364, 1371-72 (Fla. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 903 (1998).
107. See generally Closed-Circuit Television Witness Examination, 61 A.L.R. 4th 1155
(2005).
108. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69 (2004).
109. Id. (abrogating Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
110. Id. at 68.
111. Id. at 42.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 43-50.
114. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-47.
115. Id. at 43-44.
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in false convictions." 6 Consequently, English law required that an
accused be confronted with the witnesses against him.tII At the same
time, the law developed to allow such examination only upon a
showing of unavailability of the declarant.ll 8 Later, the English courts
added an additional safeguard that allowed the testimony of an
unavailable witness only if the accused had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the witness.
119
Furthermore, the Court argues that judicial practices in the
Colonies support requiring unavailability and an opportunity to cross-
examine. 120  Numerous declarations of rights at the time of the
Revolution mentioned the right to confrontation in criminal trials. 121
Finally, while the Constitution did not include a Confrontation Clause,
the Court argues, the founders made sure to include it in the Bill of
Rights. 22  Additionally, the Court refers to several early U.S.
decisions where courts required cross-examination of evidence
introduced against the accused. 123
Subsequently, the court argues that the history of the
Confrontation Clause supports two inferences. 124 First, it supports the
notion that the Confrontation Clause bars out-of-court testimonial
evidence.125 The Court notes that cases leading up to the adoption of
the Confrontation Clause required confrontation of testimonial
evidence. 126  As such, the Confrontation Clause does not bar all
hearsay, but bars only testimonial hearsay to be used against the
accused at the trial. 127 The Court notes that ex parte testimony and
statements to police officers during interrogations represent the kind
testimonial hearsay the Confrontation Clause is meant to bar.'28
The second inference is that the Confrontation Clause excludes
all testimonial evidence unless the declarant is unavailable and the
accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.129 The
Court notes that the founders did not intend any exceptions to this rule
except those present at common law at the time the Sixth Amendment
116. Seeid.
117. See id. at 44.
118. See id. at 45.
119. See id.
120. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47-50.
121. Id. at 47-48.
122. Id. at 48.
123. Id. at 49-50.
124. Id. at 50.
125. Id. at 50-51.
126. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
127. Id. at 50-52.
128. Id. at 51-52.
129. Id. at 53-54.
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was adopted. 30  Furthermore, the Court interprets the Confrontation
Clause as a necessary condition not to be disposed of.
131
Finally, the majority argues that recent case law supports its
holding. 32 It cites cases where the Court required a prior opportunity
to cross-examine even when the witness was unavailable at trial. 3 3 It
also cites cases in which the Court rejected evidence where there was a
prior opportunity to cross-examine but no showing of unavailability.' 
34
The Court then overrules the Roberts case, arguing that allowing
testimonial hearsay on a showing of reliability or trustworthiness
represents a departure from the letter of the Confrontation Clause.
135
Furthermore, admitting testimonial hearsay based on a showing of
reliability is subjective and therefore inherently unpredictable. 136
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, only
concurred in the judgment of the Court. 137 While they agree that the
founders were concerned with the admissibility of ex parte affidavits,
they argue that the Court's distinction between testimonial and non-
testimonial evidence is without merit.' 38 Chief Justice Rehnquist notes
that, historically, courts were skeptical about allowing testimonial
evidence, not necessarily because the evidence was testimonial, but
because the testimony was not made under oath.139 Furthermore, at
the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted, the law regarding hearsay
was still in its developmental stages.' Courts generally were not
consistent in excluding testimonial hearsay. 14 1 In fact, out-of-court
testimonial hearsay was often used as substantive evidence in criminal
trials. 42  Simply put, the founders did not make the distinction
between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence as explained in the
majority opinion. 143
Furthermore, at the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted,
courts around the country did not make the distinction between
testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay.' 44 Merely because some
jurisdictions made this distinction does not mean that the distinction
130. Id. at 54.
131. Id. at 54-55.
132. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58-60.
133. Id. at 57-59.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 60-61.
136. Id. at61.
137. Id. at 79 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
138. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 70-71 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
139. Id. at 70-71 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
140. Id. at 73-74 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
141, Id. at 72-73 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
142. Id. (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
143. Id. at 71 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
144. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 71-72 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
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had widespread approval.1 45  Courts were generally more concerned
with whether a declarant testified under oath. 146 Also, hearsay was
admissible as long as it satisfied an established hearsay exception. 1
47
Also, Rehnquist continued, the Sixth Amendment was adopted
at a time when hearsay law was uncertain and developing. 48  What
some courts excluded, other courts admitted into evidence.
49
Therefore, the proposition that the adoption of the Sixth Amendment
represented the inclusion of only then-existing hearsay exceptions is
inconclusive. 150 It could well be that the founders intended the law of
evidence to evolve and to include hearsay exceptions that were not
fully settled at the time the Amendment was adopted.
151
The Chief Justice further argues that the wisdom and the
motivating force behind all hearsay exceptions is that some out-of-
court statements have such indicia of reliability that the risks, which
cross-examination is meant to expose, are not at issue.1 52  This
statement is no less applicable to testimonial evidence that manifests
reliability or guarantees of trustworthiness.
153
The concurring opinion concludes by arguing that the majority
unnecessarily overrules the Roberts case.154 By overruling the Roberts
case, the Court creates immense uncertainty by failing to elaborate on
the meaning of testimonial evidence. 155 The Chief Justice notes that
the case could have been decided on less volatile grounds.' 56 Mainly,
the court could have referred to past precedent to hold that the mere
fact that the evidence at trial corroborates certain other evidence does
not make such evidence admissible.'
57
145. Id. at 72 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
146. Id. at 72-74 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
147. See id. at 73 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
148. Id. at 73 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
149. See id. (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
150. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 73-74 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
151. Id. at 74 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
152. Id. at 74-75 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
153. See id. (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
154. Id. at 76 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
155. Id. at 75 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).
156. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, J.J., concurring in judgment).




The Crawford decision created the risk that the rules of evidence
and criminal procedure will no longer be able to shield minor victims
of sexual abuse from being traumatized by their abusers at trial.' 58 On
its face, the Confrontation Clause requires that all testimonial evidence
in criminal trials be subject to effective cross-examination.' 59
However, in light of this constitutional mandate, the Court has
previously approved of rules and procedures that depart from this rigid
application of the Confrontation Clause.' 60  Statements to physicians
for the purpose of medical treatment and testimonies via CCT in cases
of child abuse are arguably in danger of becoming inadmissible as
departures from the command of the Confrontation Clause.161
A. The Crawford Holding Should Not Inhibit the Development of the
Law of Evidence to Protect Minor Victims of Sexual Abuse
These departures from the literal or mechanical application of
the Confrontation Clause illustrated the Court's attempts to develop
the rules of evidence and trial procedure consistent with the
Constitution. Specifically, the use of CCT testimony and the
admissibility of certain out-of-court statements represent the long-
standing notion that the mandate of the Confrontation Clause is not
impermeable and that there are instances where the clause must yield
to important public interests and trial necessities. 62 This interpretation
is consistent with the idea that the founders did not intend for a rigid,
literal, and mechanical application of the Confrontation Clause.
163
While the language of the Confrontation Clause does not mention any
exceptions, the Court in Crawford noted that the founders intended to
preserve certain hearsay exceptions existing at common law.'
64
Also, this interpretation is consistent with the intent of
Congress in passing the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 611
specifically provides that judges should adopt such trial procedures as
are necessary to protect witnesses from harassment or undue
158. Id. at 68-69.
159. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-48 (1990).
160. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.
161. Fed. R. Evid. 803(4); see also Craig, 497 U.S. at 861-62.
162. Craig, 497 U.S. at 850.
163. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54-55.
164. Id. However, it is debatable whether the founders intended to preclude the
introduction of new hearsay exceptions over time. Chief Justice Rehnquist persuasively
argues that the founders intended hearsay law to develop over time, thus not precluding the
introduction of new hearsay exceptions. Id. at 71-76 (Rehnquist, O'Connor J.J., concurring in
judgment).
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embarrassment and as are necessary "for the ascertainment of truth."'16 5
The Court and the United States Congress provided that judges should
make evidentiary decisions as are necessary for the "promotion of the
growth and development of the law of evidence."'
166
Furthermore, judges retain wide discretion to implement
procedures to advance important public interests. 167 One such interest
is the protection of minor victims of sexual abuse. 168 Additionally, the
Court has also held that this interest is compelling and may outweigh a
defendant's right to confrontation. 169 Therefore, to the extent that
statements to physicians and CCT testimony represent the growth of
the law of evidence consistent with the founders intent, the Court's
precedent, and the Congressional mandate, any future Court decision,
applying the Crawford rational to preclude the use of CCT and
statements to physicians, will stagnate the growth of the law of
evidence.
Additionally, any future case extending the Crawford rational
to require that minor victims of sexual abuse testify in the actual
courtroom and before the defendant would deny the efforts of the
majority of the states to shield children from the trauma of testifying in
the physical presence of their sexual predators. Thirty-seven states
currently permit testimony via CCT. 17° Of these, twenty-four states
permit the use of one-way CCT testimony (the child cannot see the
courtroom but the jury and the defendant can see the child). 17 1 Thus, a
Supreme Court decision expanding the applicability of the Crawford
decision would invalidate the efforts of a great many states to promote
the important public interest of protecting their youth from trauma
resulting from confronting their abusers in court.
The likelihood that that a Crawford successor would invalidate
the use of CCT testimony and statements to physicians is not wide of
the mark. CCT testimony could be subjected to the Court's reasoning
in Crawford because a child testifying via CCT could be considered
out-of-court, and the evidence obtained may be testimonial. 172 This
argument is supported by cases that admit a child's statements that
identify the perpetrator or that are otherwise trustworthy under the
165. Fed R. Evid. 611.
166. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 281 (1987); State v. Tarrago, 800 So.2d
300, 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Fed. R. Evid. 102.
167. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 850.
168. Id. at 852-56.
169. Id. at 853.
170. Id. at 853-56.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 851; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52-54 (2004).
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circumstances. 173  For example, a judge applying the Crawford
analysis could find that a child's statement to a doctor about the
identity of the abuser and the abuse are not just for effective treatment
but are also reasonably expected to be introduced by the victim at trial
against the abuser. Because such statements are often used against the
abuser at trial, they are testimonial. In addition, a defendant could
argue that the use of CCT violates the Confrontation Clause because it
deprives him of face-to-face confrontation. 74  Thus, if deemed
testimonial, statements to physicians would be subject to criticism
because they are made out-of-court, without subjecting the child to an
oath and cross-examination at the time the statement is made.'
75
Also, Justice Scalia's dissent in Craig arguably predicts the
possibility that Crawford may invalidate the use of CCT testimony and
statements to physicians.' 76 This dissent is of particular importance
because Justice Scalia is also the author of the Crawford decision.
177
In Craig, Justice Scalia argues that the right of the accused to have a
face-to-face confrontation with the witness against him is a
''categorical guarantee of the Constitution" which should not yield to
policy interests calling for exceptions to the Confrontation Clause
(even in cases involving minor victims of sexual abuse). 178 Justice
Scalia further argued, "The Confrontation Clause guarantees not only
what it explicitly provides for-'face-to-face' confrontation-but also
implied ... collateral rights such as cross-examination."' 79 Therefore,
it is likely that the Crawford decision places equal importance on
subjecting testimonial evidence to cross-examination and face-to-face
confrontation. As such, a future case could deny a child victim the
ability to testify via CCT and introduce statements made to physicians.
It is also important to note that four justices sided with Scalia in
Craig. 8  This matter is further complicated by the appointment of
Chief Justice Roberts (possibly sharing Justice Scalia's view) and the
retirement of Justice O'Connor, the author of the Court's opinion in
Craig.
81
Furthermore, while neither the majority nor the dissent in
Craig answered whether testimony of a minor victim of sexual abuse
173. U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 439 (8th Cir. 1985); see U.S. v. Whitted, II F.3d
782 (8th Cir. 1993).
174. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57-58.
175. Renville, 779 F.2d at 436.
176. Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (Scalia, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
177. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
178. Craig, 497 U.S. at 861-62 (Scalia, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 862 (Scalia, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 860 (Scalia, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
181. Id. at 836.
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via CCT constitutes hearsay, Justice Scalia has already taken a
position on the issue. 182 He argued that, if CCT testimony is hearsay,
it is hearsay that does not measure up to live testimony, "and can be
employed only when the [witness] is unavailable." ' 3 While this
position may allow for the admissibility of some statements made to
physicians, it is harder to argue that a witness testifying via CCT is
unavailable at the time of trial.
184
B. The Continued Admissibility of Statements to Physicians and Use
of Testimony via CCT is Necessary to Protect Minor Victims
of Sexual Abuse and Insure the Reliability of Evidence
As such, the Crawford decision represents a clear risk that a
state may no longer promote the important interest of protecting minor
victims (witnesses) of child abuse. A future case invalidating the use
of CCT testimony and the introduction of statements made to
physicians would ignore the fact that the state has a compelling
interest in protecting its vulnerable youth.185  On prior occasions,
courts found that a child might suffer severe trauma and long-term
damage if confronted face-to-face with the sexual predator.1 86 Courts
have also found that, as a result of the trauma, a minor witness may not
be able to testify accurately or testify at all.187 And in some cases,
evidence was introduced to suggest that minors, when confronted with
the abuser, might distort and minimize their abominable
experiences. 8  In this respect, the state will not only fail to protect
minors from additional trauma, but will also fail to maintain the
validity and the accuracy of the fact-finding process-the very thing
that the Confrontation Clause is meant to guarantee.
182. Id. at 851-852, 865.
183. Id. at 865-66.
184. It is hard to argue that a witness is unavailable when the witness is present in court
and testifying via CCT. However, an argument could be made that a minor witness, although
testifying via CCT, is unavailable to testify in front of the abuser due to the stress and trauma
that may arise if confronted by the abuser.
185. Craig, 497 U.S. at 837.
186. Id. at 856-57. See also People v. Handerson, 503 N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986).
187. Craig, 497 U.S. at 841-42.
188. See Danner v. Com., 963 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1010
(1998). See also Craig, 497 U.S. at 841-42.
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C. Applying the Crawford Analysis Is Not the Only Way to Meet the
Requirements of the Confrontation Clause-Courts Have
Alternative Criteria to Determine Reliability
A reading of the Confrontation Clause that precludes the use of
CCT testimony and out-of-court statements to physicians would ignore
that the admissibility of such statements is narrowly tailored. Over the
years, courts have developed procedures and rules to insure that the
admissibility of evidence stays within the spirit of the Confrontation
Clause. 189  Because the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to
insure the reliability of the fact-finding process, the Court allows
evidence that substantially complies with this constitutional
mandate. 9 0
Because CCT testimony substantially complies with the
Confrontation Clause, most jurisdictions approve of CCT testimony.
19 1
The Supreme Court has held that CCT testimony is significantly more
reliable and trustworthy than other types of hearsay. 2 Specifically,
when testimony is provided via CCT, the witness is under oath and is
subject to immediate cross-examination.1 93 Also, while the witness (in
one-way CCT) cannot see the defendant, the judge, the jury, and the
defendant can observe the demeanor of the witness, and the defendant
has the ability to communicate with his attorney during the
testimony.1 94 In addition, courts that permit the use of CCT also find
that the minor will be adversely affected by providing live testimony,
not because of the courtroom atmosphere, but because of defendant's
physical presence. 95
Furthermore, courts have repeatedly admitted out-of-court
statements to physicians because they substantially comply with the
Confrontation Clause.' 96  Generally, for hearsay evidence to be
admissible the declarant must be unavailable and the evidence must
have indicia of reliability. 197  Courts generally presume reliability
189. Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-856. In Craig, the Court examines: (1) whether the use of
CCT is necessary to protect the child, (2) whether the child will experience trauma by the
presence of the defendant and not by virtue of being in the courtroom, and (3) whether the
child will suffer minimal trauma. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 853-54, 856-57.
192. Id. at 851.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56.
196. See U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Whitted, 11 F.3d
782 (8th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 100 (9th Cir. 1992).
197. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
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when the statement falls into a well-recognized hearsay exception. 
98
If these conditions are not met, courts still admit hearsay that manifests
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' 99  These safeguards
effectively prevent any meaningful departure from the command of the
Confrontation Clause.
Statements made by minor victims of sexual abuse to treating
physicians frequently meet the above conditions.200 Courts admit such
statements because they are necessary for medical treatment. 201 And,
even when they are not necessary for medical treatment, courts
sometimes admit them because of their manifest reliability. 20 2 Courts
have commented that minor children have neither the motive nor the
inclination to lie about sexual abuse-a matter generally unknown to a
minor.203  Also, courts often find that a statement is admissible
because the minor victim is unavailable. 204 Here, one could make the
argument that a minor is unavailable when the trauma and stress in the
aftermath of the abuse render the child unable to communicate at trial.
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court should not apply the
Crawford decision to preclude the use of statements to physicians and
testimony via CCT when both substantially comply with the
Confrontation Clause.
D. The Confrontation Clause Asks Whether the Evidence is Reliable
and Not Whether the Evidence Is Testimonial
Finally, the policy rational behind the Confrontation Clause
is to provide and insure that there is a reliable fact-finding mechanism
in criminal trials. 205  However, the Constitution also provides
protection to victims and gives them recourse when others commit
unthinkable crimes against them. Indeed, the future welfare of a child
may depend on the kind of evidence that he can present against the
sexual predator. Where the best or the most reliable evidence is the
testimony of the child, and where such child may effectively present
this evidence only under certain circumstances as a result of the sexual
abuse, to deny the child's testimony is to undermine the validity of the
fact-finding process and the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.
198. See, e.g., id.
199. Id.
200. George, 960 F.2d at 100.
201. Renville, 779 F.2d at 436.
202. George, 960 F.2d at 100.
203. See State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836, 842 (Kan. 1985).
204. See id. at 844-845.
205. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
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Still, any future case challenging to the admissibility of hearsay
statements to physicians or the use of CCT testimony may succeed
under the holding in Crawford. The continued acceptance of out-of-
court statements to physicians and CCT testimonies will depend on
whether the Court will revert back to a philosophy symbiotic with the
Confrontation Clause that favors the development of the rules of
evidence to accommodate all relevant interests and not just those of
the defendant. One venue for doing so is to adopt Chief Justice
Rehnquist's view in Crawford.2° 6  That is, the concern of the
Confrontation Clause is not whether the evidence is testimonial but
whether the evidence is reliable and trustworthy.2 °7
On the issue of reliability, courts traditionally admitted
testimonial evidence given under oath because the oath itself gave rise
to a presumption of reliability. Nevertheless, even beyond the oath
requirement or the cross-examination requirement (mechanisms to
insure reliability), the fundamental role of the Confrontation Clause
remains to insure the reliability of evidence. That is and should be the
threshold issue when considering the admissibility of evidence.
Whether the evidence is given under oath or is subject to cross-
examination are mere means to insure reliability that are not mutually
exclusive with other similar criteria that a court may deem appropriate.
But even if the Court does not abandon the distinction between
testimonial and non-testimonial evidence, the Court should approach
the problem as it does in other cases involving fundamental procedural
and substantive rights and compelling state interests. 208 Therefore,
even if Justice Scalia's analysis in Crawford prevails, there is no
reason why the Court should not make room for compelling state
interests when the means to achieve such interests are narrowly
tailored.209  The Court has already declared that protecting minor
witnesses from trauma is a compelling interest. 2  If the use of hearsay
statements to physicians and CCT is narrowly tailored, the Court
should give its blessing. But if not, the Court should provide
guidelines, and federal and state legislators should draft rules that
would make these evidentiary practices narrowly tailored.
206. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69-76 (2004).
207. See id.
208. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
209. See id.
210. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,837-38 (1990).
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V. CONCLUSION
While the Crawford decision attempts to insure the reliability
of the fact-finding process under the Confrontation Clause, it has
produced certain undesired side effects. Specifically, by allowing the
use of hearsay testimonial evidence only when the defendant had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, and where the
declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, the court has effectively
barred the use of CCT and hearsay statements for the purpose of
medical diagnosis and treatment. Courts often admit these forms of
evidence to avoid forcing minor victims of sexual abuse to testify in
the presence of their alleged abusers. By making the future use of
these practices uncertain, the court risks traumatizing minor victims by
requiring their testimony in the presence of their sexual predators.
Consequently, the Court also risks undermining the validity of the
fact-finding process by making it hard or impossible for minor victims
to testify honestly, accurately and confidently against their abusers.
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